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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new dataset on regional authority in 27 Latin American
and Caribbean countries for 1950–2010 based on the Regional Authority
Index (RAI), which makes it possible to compare regional authority over time
and across regions. We explain conceptualization, operationalization, and
coding decisions with the aim of making judgments explicit, and therefore
open to amendment or refutation. We present substantive observations about
the variation across countries and over time and discuss the implications and
challenges of expanding the RAI to contexts in which democracy and
authoritarianism alternate.
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An extensive literature has investigated the sources and consequences of
decentralization in Latin America, generating diverse and sophisticated the-
ories. Yet while theorizing has been concerned with subnational authority
broadly conceived – the extent to which subnational governments have the
legal capacity to make binding decisions- the available measures often use
spending or revenue as a proxy for decentralization (e.g. Daughters and
Harper 2007; Escobar-Lemmon 2001; Stegarescu 2005). This is problematic
to the extent that central governments provide subnational actors with
money yet tell them how to spend it.
Our purpose in this article is therefore to bring measurement of the structure
of government more in line with the way political scientists have conceived it.
We introduce a new measure of regionalization – the Regional Authority Index
(RAI) – and describe how it is applied to Latin America and the Caribbean.
The RAI includes 27 countries in the region on an annual basis from 1950 to
2010 (Hooghe et al. 2016).1 We disaggregate regional authority in 10
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dimensions across 2 domains: self-rule, the authority a regional government
exercises within its territorial jurisdiction; and shared rule, the authority a
regional government (co)exercises in the country as a whole. Here we
describe our measurement instrument as applied to Latin America. We
make our conceptual and measurement decisions explicit by defining
coding rules, collating examples, and deliberating ambiguities. Additionally,
we explain the challenges that this measurement instrument faces in Latin
America, and most particularly in cases of alternation between authoritarian
and democratic rule. Our aim is to distinguish regional authority from
those variables that are used to explain subnational authority, including the
character of the regime.
In the final section, we illustrate how the RAI helps us probe the intricate
connection between democratization and regionalization. We explore
general patterns of association between the RAI and regime type, and we
suggest that the relationship is not constant over time. Over the past six
decades, the pace of regional reform and regime change has quickened,
there is now greater divergence among Latin American countries in how
regionalization and democratization are connected than in 1950. On
average, democratization has lifted the lid on pressures for decentralization,
but it has also increased the menu options for democratic rulers seeking to
manipulate territorial organization for political ends.
Measuring regional authority
Previous measures
The most refined and widely used data on regional government in Latin
America and the Caribbean are financial data provided by the Inter-American
Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank
(Daughters and Harper 2007; Escobar-Lemmon 2001; Stegarescu 2005).
These data have been used to good effect, but a) they do not distinguish
among levels of regional government and b) they do not directly measure
regional authority. It is one thing for a regional government to collect taxes
or spend, but quite another to set the rate or base of taxes, or determine
spending priorities. Departamentos in Uruguay, for example, spend more
than twice as much as a proportion of total government expenditure as
those in Bolivia (15.4% versus 7.2%), but have less authority over taxes
(Daughters and Harper 2007, 224).
Measures that seek more direct estimates of regional authority often rely
on the distinction between federal and non-federal countries (Arzaghi and
Henderson 2005; Inman 2008), but this distinction is insensitive to variation
within these categories (Rodden 2004, 2006; Schakel 2008). Decentralization
is often the result of ongoing political choice (Eaton 2008), so we would
expect more fluidity in the authority wielded by subnational governments
than in the federal vs. unitary categorization. Several countries including
federal Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and non-federal Bolivia, Colombia, and
Uruguay have seen considerable regionalization without crossing the
unitary-federal divide.
A useful categorization of state structure is the tripartite distinction
between fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization (Falleti 2005;
Montero and Samuels 2004). Fiscal decentralization is control over subna-
tional revenue generation and spending; administrative decentralization is
the authority of subnational governments to set goals and implement pol-
icies; and political decentralization refers to direct elections for subnational
offices. These distinctions have proven valuable, for example, in analysing
sequences of reform (Falleti 2010), but they have not been quantified on an
annual basis and are concerned exclusively with the authority of a regional
government in its own region, and hence, only tap self-rule.
We might wish to know how the authority of regions influences the rules of
the game in the country as a whole. To what degree does the central state
have the last word on constitutional change? This goes to the core of the
federal-unitary distinction, but one cannot assume that regional governments
in a federal regime can block constitutional change while those in a unitary
regime cannot.
Related to this, there is the question of the role of regional governments in
national law making. Are they represented in a national legislature, and if so,
to what effect? Can regional governments co-determine the proportion of
national tax revenue that accrues to them? Do they have routinized access
to extra-legislative channels to influence, or bind, the national government?
To what extent, in short, do regional governments share rule in the country
as a whole?
It is useful, as well, to disaggregate the capacity of a regional government
to exert authority within its own jurisdiction. On fiscal decentralization, one
needs to pin down whether a regional government can control the base
and rate of major and/or minor taxes and the degree to which it can auton-
omously borrow. On administrative decentralization, it is vital to estimate
whether the central government can veto regional government and the
kinds of policies over which regional governments exert authority. On political
decentralization, one might distinguish between indirect and direct election
of offices, and further, between the election of regional governors and
regional assemblies.
The issues raised here are diverse, but researchable. They take an important
step forward in pressing an abstract concept, regional authority, into indi-
cators that can be assessed by observing public institutions, and that may
help researchers resolve differences of interpretation by examining the
evidence.
The Regional Authority Index
Our unit of analysis is the regional government, defined as government
between the local and the national levels having an average population
greater than 150,000. Regional governments are generally organized at
non-intersecting tiers, whereby each government has the same authoritative
competences. Where this is the case, we evaluate regions on a tier-by-tier
basis, but if a regional government has special competences, we code it sep-
arately. The intuition is to think of an individual citizen as nested within a set
of regional jurisdictions that jointly exert authority. Hence, country scores can
be interpreted as estimates of the authority exercised by a country’s regional
governments over its citizens.
Municipal decentralization falls outside the current scope of the RAI, except
where regions – usually national capitals – combine the status of a municipal-
ity with that of a special region. Our study highlights the need to make
headway in theorizing and estimating local governance if we wish to have
a fuller understanding of governance across scale.2
The dependent variable is the authority exercised by a regional govern-
ment. Authority is conceived as legitimate power recognized as binding
because it is derived from accepted principles of governance (Dahl 1968).
We operationalize regional authority in two domains: Self-rule is the authority
that a regional government exercises in its own territory while Shared rule is
the authority that a regional government co-exercises in the country as a
whole. This distinction is widely used in the study of decentralization and fed-
eralism (Elazar 1987; Hooghe and Marks 2013; Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel
2010; Lane and Ersson 1999; Riker 1964; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). We dis-
aggregate these domains in 10 dimensions, each of which is indicated by
institutional alternatives for a region or regional tier that can be reliably
assessed using constitutions, laws, executive orders, and government docu-
ments. Table 1 reproduces the domains, dimensions, and indicators.3
Self-rule is composed of five dimensions. Institutional depth is the extent to
which a regional government can make autonomous policy decisions, inde-
pendent from control by the central state. While a deconcentrated govern-
ment is subordinate to the centre, a decentralized government can make
autonomous decisions. Scores at the upper range distinguish between
regional governments that are subject, or not, to a central government
veto. Policy scope taps the breadth of policy authority of a regional govern-
ment within its jurisdiction. Does the regional government have authority
over economic, cultural-educational, welfare, policing, own institutional set–
up, and local government; does it have residual powers; do its competences
extend to immigration or citizenship? Regional policy authority is crucial for
understanding potential conflict between the national and regional govern-
ments over the design and implementation of policies (Eaton 2017;
Table 1. Self-rule and Shared rule
Self-rule: The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region.
Institutional
depth
The extent to which a regional government






No functioning general–purpose administration at regional level.
Deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration.
Non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration subject to central government veto.
Non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration not subject to central government veto.







Very weak authoritative competencies in a), b), c), d).
Authoritative competencies in a), b), c) or d) whereby a) economic policy; b) cultural-educational policy;
c) welfare policy; d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set–up, local
government.
Authoritative competencies in at least two of a), b), c), or d).
Authoritative competencies in d) and at least two of a), b), or c).
Criteria for 3 plus authority over immigration or citizenship.
Fiscal
autonomy
The extent to which a regional government






Central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes.
Regional government sets the rate of minor taxes.
Regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes.
Regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or
sales tax.
Regional government sets base and rate of at least one major tax.
Borrowing
autonomy






The region does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing).
The region may borrow under prior authorization (ex ante) by the central government and with one or
more of the following centrally imposed restrictions:
a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits)
b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank
c. no borrowing above a ceiling
d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes.
The region may borrow without prior authorization and under one or more of a), b), c), d).
The region may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.
Representation The extent to which a region has an












Regional executive appointed by central government.
Dual executive appointed by central government and regional assembly.
Regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or directly elected.
Shared rule:The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole.







Regions are the unit of representation in a national legislature.
Regional governments designate representatives in a national legislature.
Regions have majority representation in a national legislature based on regional representation.
The legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority.
Executive
control
The extent to which a regional government





No routine meetings between central and regional governments to negotiate policy.
Routine meetings between central and regional governments without legally binding authority.
Routine meetings between central and regional governments with legally binding authority.
Fiscal control The extent to which regional
representatives co–determine the




Neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over
the distribution of national tax revenues.
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of
tax revenues, but do not have a veto.




The extent to which a regional government





Regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints.
Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto.
Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints and have a veto.
Constitutional
reform








The central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution.
A national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform,
raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require
a popular referendum.
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone
constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the
other chamber, or require a popular referendum.
A legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change; or constitutional change
requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation.
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change.
Niedzwiecki 2016, 2018). Fiscal autonomy tells us what authority a regional
government has over taxation within its jurisdiction. What is a regional gov-
ernment’s authority to set the base or rate of minor or major taxes in its jur-
isdiction? This dimension is concerned with the authority of a government to
determine the rules for taxation, rather than spending levels. Borrowing auton-
omy estimates the extent of centrally imposed restrictions on the capacity of a
regional government to independently contract debt on international or
domestic financial markets. Representation tracks whether a regional govern-
ment has a locally elected legislature; whether it is directly or indirectly
elected; and whether the region’s executive is appointed by the central gov-
ernment, dual (i.e. co-appointed by the centre), or independently elected
(either by the citizens or the regional assembly).
Shared rule is also composed of five dimensions. Lawmaking evaluates how
the region is represented at the national level; whether it has minority or
majority representation in a territorial chamber; and the legislative scope of
that chamber. Executive control assesses whether regional governments
have routine meetings with the central government and whether their
decisions are advisory or binding. Fiscal control evaluates the role of regions
in determining the territorial distribution of central tax revenue. Borrowing
control assesses whether regional governments have a say over borrowing
restrictions. Constitutional reform gauges what authority a regional govern-
ment or regional electorate has to propose, postpone, or block constitutional
change.
A regional government can exercise shared rule bilaterally with the centre
(i.e. a region acting alone) or multilaterally alongside other regions (i.e. contin-
gent on coordination with other regions in the same tier).
Numerical estimates of the dimensions for each region or country can be
arithmetically summed or used as indicators of a latent variable. It does not
make much difference which approach one chooses because the Pearson cor-
relation between additive and factor scores is 0.99. The Cronbach’s alpha is
0.867, which is well above the conventional threshold of 0.7 for an index. A
single-factor solution using polychoric correlations for 2010 accounts for
66% of the variance in the indicators. When we impose a two-factor solution,
nine of ten indicators load strongly on one latent factor and weakly on the
other. In all, the solution is broadly consistent with the theoretical distinction
between self-rule and shared rule (Table 2).
Our focus here is chiefly at the country level, but it is worth noting that the
information allows comparison among individual regions. Attention to the
complexity of authority and its multiple indicators produces more reliable esti-
mation than country-level analysis composed of just one, two, or three
elements because combining observations reduces the random error of the
latent variable (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008; Marks 2007).
The RAI taps legal authority, which directs us to legal documents – consti-
tutions, framework laws, ordinary laws, executive orders, decrees, court
rulings, etc. However, what is written and what is practiced may differ.
Some written rules never make it into practice. If the constitution states
that regional governments may tax their own populations, yet enabling legis-
lation was never passed, then we do not consider the regions to have fiscal
authority. This was, for example, the case in departamentos and provincias
in Peru (see C 1979, Article 257; Dickovick 2004, 7). With the same logic, we
code the date a reform (or election) takes place, not the date written in legis-
lation. In Argentina’s senate, for example, there was a 17-year lag between the
1994 Constitution’s promise of direct elections and its implementation. Finally,
we code regularized and explicit norms that do not make it into written texts.
A regime that establishes the norm that it can routinely sack regional gover-
nors clearly diminishes the authority of regional executives – a practice in
Argentina, for example, where federal intervention was routinized despite
being formally designated only for use in case of emergency (C 1994, Art.
6). However, one must take care to encompass only institutionalized practice,
not exogenous influences such as the charisma of a political leader or the
many factors that can affect the ability of a government to achieve its goals.
Regional authority across time and space
Nineteen of the 27 Latin American countries have at least one intermediate
tier of governance in 2010; two of these (Chile and Peru) have two tiers.
Only seven countries have no intermediate government between the local
and national. Fourteen countries have had differentiated regions, i.e.
Table 2. Polychoric factor analysis.
Two-factor solution
Components Single-factor solution Self-rule Shared rule
Institutional depth 0.82 0.89 0.03
Policy scope 0.89 0.94 0.05
Fiscal autonomy 0.76 0.39 0.48
Borrowing autonomy 0.89 0.86 0.14
Representation 0.77 0.99 −0.20
Law making 0.62 0.11 0.61
Executive control 0.79 0.12 0.80
Fiscal control 0.67 −0.08 0.87
Borrowing control 0.60 −0.18 0.90
Constitutional reform 0.66 0.13 0.64





Notes: Principal components factor analysis, promax non-orthogonal rotation, listwise deletion. n = 27
(country scores in 2010). For the two-factor solution, the highest score for each dimension is in bold.
regions with authoritative competences that distinguish them from other
regions in the same country.4
Figure 1 presents country scores for 1950–2010. The picture is diverse, both
cross-nationally and over time. Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina are the most
regionalized, while Venezuela (nominally federal) has relatively weak
regions. The RAI detects considerable cross-national and over-time variation
within the non-federal category, as exhibited by the trends in Bolivia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.
There has been a definite secular upswing in regional authority in Latin
America over the past 60 years, and at the same time, variation among
countries has increased. The standard deviation in the RAI for 20 countries
is 6.6 in 1950; in 2010, it is 7.2. In 1950, all 20 independent Latin American
countries had some form of intermediate government, but only Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico had regional government with an RAI greater
than 10. By 2010, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay were also in this
group.5 Fourteen countries have become more regionalized by one or more
points, nine have the same score, and four have become less regionalized
(Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Ecuador).
Figure 2 summarizes average RAI score across 27 Latin American countries
from 1950 to 2010. The imposition of military rule in the 1960s and 1970s in
several countries is evident, as is the effect of the third wave of democracy
from the early 1980s. The average level of regionalization in 1950 was
reached again in 1990.
Figure 1. Country trends 1950–2010.
Patterns in self-rule and shared rule
Components of regional authority tend to move together, but there is never-
theless interesting variation. Figure 3 portrays the evolution in self-rule. The
solid black line captures the surge in elected regional assemblies and execu-
tives that took place after democratization from 1980. Representation is the
dimension that recovered fastest, but also the one that surpassed earlier
levels most markedly. In 1950, 9 of the 20 countries had directly or indirectly
elected executives or assemblies, but only Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and
Uruguay had both. By 2010, 16 countries had directly or indirectly elected
regional executives or assemblies, and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela had both.6
The policy competences of regional governments have broadened sub-
stantially. In 1950, just three countries had regions with authoritative compe-
tences in at least two major policy areas; in 2010, eight countries had them.
Average regional fiscal autonomy has inched up slightly. In 2010, regions in
five countries had some capacity to control the base or rate of taxes.
Figure 4 shows that the changes in regional shared rule have been smaller.
Whereas self-rule can be reformed in ways that do not affect a country’s
central political institutions, shared rule engages law making, policy making,
fiscal and borrowing control, and constitutional reform for the country as a
whole. Overall, regional authority in law-making and constitutional reform
has decreased. This was due to the reform or abolition of territorially-based
Figure 2. Evolution of regional authority in Latin America from 1950 to 2010.
Note: Average RAI across the 27 Latin American countries for 1950–2010.
second chambers in Colombia, Cuba, and Ecuador.7 Fiscal control has
remained relatively static, while borrowing control and executive control
have inched up. In 1950, routinized intergovernmental bargaining on
Figure 3. Evolution of self-rule dimensions 1950–2010.
Note: Average scores across Latin American countries with continuous data for 1950–2010. Scales differ:
institutional depth (0–3), policy scope (0–4), fiscal autonomy (0–4), borrowing autonomy (0–3), and rep-
resentation (0–4). Country scores can be higher if there is more than one tier. Only Chile (since 1976) and
Peru have two tiers (Peru had three tiers for 1989–1992).
Figure 4. Evolution of shared rule dimensions 1950–2010.
Note: Average scores across the Latin American countries with continuous data for 1950–2010. Scales
differ: law making, executive control, fiscal control, and borrowing control (0–2), and constitutional
reform (0–3).
borrowing and executive policy was virtually unknown, but by 2010 regional
governments in five countries had access to such tools.
Differentiated governance
A striking feature of regional governance worldwide is the rise in differen-
tiated governance: the proliferation of institutional arrangements that
provide individual regions with authoritative competences that distinguish
them from other regions in the same country (Hooghe and Marks 2016).
This trend is also observable in Latin America.
We distinguish three types of differentiated regions. An asymmetric region
falls under a country-wide constitutional structure but scores differently on
one or more dimensions of the RAI. An autonomous region is exempt from the
country-wide constitutional frameworkand receives special treatment as an indi-
vidual jurisdiction in a bilateral relationship with the centre. A dependency is a
region – often a colony or frontier territory – subject to direct rule by the centre.
Table 3 compares asymmetric, autonomous, and dependency arrange-
ments over three time points. Differentiation has increased – with the
notable exception of dependency.
Until the 1980s dependency was common in Latin America. Several countries
possess inaccessible and scarcely populated territories with indigenous min-
orities, and the dominant rationale for dependency was the perceived national
interest in direct federal control. In the 1980s and 1990s dependencies in Argen-
tina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico were absorbed into the national territorial
system with the same authority as existing decentralized regions. By 2010, just
three dependencies – all centrally governed – survived: the Distrito Federal in
Venezuela; the dependencias, a group of islands with some 3,000 inhabitants
off the coast of Caracas; and Isla de la Juventud in Cuba.
In contrast, autonomous and asymmetric regions have proliferated – from
2 in 1950 to 22 in 2010. Autonomous and asymmetric regions arise chiefly
from communal and ethnic difference. Tobago was granted self-rule within
Trinidad and Tobago in 1980. The Galápagos Islands of Ecuador achieved
autonomy in 1998. Special autonomous regions for indigenous communities
have been created in Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Colombia, alongside five comar-
cas in Panamá, which have existed with varying degrees of institutionalization
since the early twentieth century.
Table 3. Asymmetric, autonomous, and dependency regions over three time periods.
1950 1980 2010
Autonomy 2 (1) 4 (1) 19 (7)
Asymmetry 0 0 3 (1)
Dependency 34 (6) 24 (6) 3 (0)
Note: Figures in brackets refer to capital regions.
The new indigenous territories in Bolivia have less authority than traditional
regions, but are in transition (Faguet 2013). In Colombia, the resguardos indí-
genas and the special archipelago region of San Andrés, Providencia & Santa
Catalina also have slightly lower levels of regional authority. In Panama and
Nicaragua, these special territories have higher levels of authority than the
rest of the tier. Since 2010, the resource-rich region of Gran Chaco in southern
Bolivia has a special statute.
A second source of differential empowerment arises from capital regions.
Capital regions play a distinct role as potential sites for protest or revolt,
and their proximity to national power makes them desirable bases for political
entrepreneurs with national ambition. All of this may induce an authoritarian
ruler to place the capital under direct control. In contrast, democratic rulers
may be more responsive to their special functionality, and grant them differ-
entiated authority. Hence, in 1950, six of the seven capital regions with a
differentiated status were dependencies. By 2010, eight capital regions with
differentiated status were autonomous or asymmetrical.
Latin America has fewer differentiated regions than Europe or North
America, and these regions are not uncommonly authoritatively weaker
than standard regions in the same country. Perhaps this is due to later (re)de-
mocratization. However, the politics of indigenous mobilization is opening up
opportunities for territorial restructuring (Eisenstadt 2011; Faguet 2013; Van
Cott 2005; Yashar 1999, 2005). One plausible future trend, then, is the prolifer-
ation of special arrangements for territorial minorities.
Measuring regional authority under regime change
The RAI is conceptually distinct from regime type and this guides our coding.
Keeping these two concepts separate is vital for generating hypotheses on the
relationship between democratization and regionalization. There are wide
differences in the degree to which authoritarian regimes control the military,
the legislature, and subnational governments. There are also wide differences
in the degree to which purportedly democratic regimes allow subnational
elections. We reflect these nuances in the measurement instrument.
Where an authoritarian regime takes legal or executive steps to reduce the
autonomy of regional authorities, we lower the score for the affected indi-
cator. Institutional depth drops from its maximum to an intermediate score
in Brazil in 1964 to reflect the legal constraints on state government
imposed by the military regime. While Brazilian estados maintained some
fiscal autonomy and policy scope, the military government regularly used
its decree powers to intervene. It replaced direct with indirect elections for
governors, thus affecting the representation dimension. The 1967 constitution
did away with the notion that estados were self-governing. All this underpins
the observation that military rule impaired the authority of Brazilian states
without reducing them to deconcentrated units (Dickovick 2004; Eaton 2001;
Falleti 2011; Wilson et al. 2008). One can debate the timing: 1964, when the
regime assumed power and passed several disempowering pieces of legis-
lation, or 1967, when state self-governance was constitutionally limited. We
select the early date because it appears more consistent with facts on the
ground, such as the replacement of opposition governors as early as 1964
and the passing of the first of the Atos Institucionais.
The nuance of coding under authoritarian rule is also illustrated as the mili-
tary period in Brazil draws to a close. While democratic transition is generally
marked in 1985, the shift in regional authority came earlier as part of the aber-
tura process. Competitive elections for governors and the legalization of pol-
itical parties in regional and local elections took place before democratic
presidential elections, so regional authority begins to creep up in 1982.
Authoritarian regimes rarely abolish subnational institutions. Two partial
exceptions are Cuba and Chile. The Castro revolution initially sidelined provin-
cial and municipal institutions in favour of sectoral juntas (Roman 2003a,
2003b). The system failed and in 1966 the regime reintroduced local and pro-
vincial general-purpose government with representative institutions (Malino-
witz 2006; Mendez Delgado and Lloret Feijoo 2007). We reflect this in our
coding by reducing institutional depth to 0 for 1959–1965 and bringing it
back to 1 with the revival of territorial regional government. Chile entered
the Pinochet military regime (1973–1987) with two tiers of deconcentrated
government: departamentos and provincias. The regime sustained provincias,
abolished departamentos, and created a new upper layer of 15 deconcen-
trated regiones in an effort to deliver economic development to Pinochet’s pri-
marily non-urban constituencies (Eaton 2004).
Authoritarianism constrains representation if elections for subnational
executives or legislatures are suspended or abolished, but authoritarian
rulers do not always suspend subnational elections. Argentina illustrates the
range of choice. The 1955 military coup ousted the national government
but left provincial institutions intact (Eaton 2004, 71). During the Revolución
Argentina (1966–1972), all elected governors were replaced by central govern-
ment appointees. Provincial legislative responsibilities were put under control
of the (now appointed) provincial executive. During the 1976–1982 dictator-
ship, the provincial assemblies were disbanded and the military distributed
control over provincial administration in equal shares amongst the army,
navy, and air force (Eaton 2004, 71 and 117–118; Falleti 2010). Representation
has the maximum score under the first military regime, but 0 under the
second and third.
The military regime in Brazil (1964–1985) was more measured. Initially, it
maintained direct elections for governors and assemblies, and later an indirect
system was introduced whereby assemblies chose governors from a central
government list (Samuels and Abrucio 2000, 48–9). In contrast to the
authoritarian regimes in Chile and Argentina, elections were never cancelled,
but representative authority was restricted. Governors could be replaced by
the military regime (and some 25% were in 1964 alone), and direct elections
for assemblies took place under a new constitutional framework restricting
political parties and civil liberties. Our scoring reflects the contrasting strat-
egies of the military in Argentina and Brazil: a sharp drop from the
maximum to the minimum score on representation in Argentina and an inter-
mediate score for both assembly and executive in Brazil.
The PRI regime in Mexico pursued an alternative path. Estado governors
were directly elected from 1917, but the president had the right to remove
elected governors and appoint new ones. We conceive this as a ‘dual execu-
tive’ because it is in part centrally and in part locally appointed. Executive rep-
resentation changes from 1 to 2 in 1989 when the first non-PRI governor won
the gubernatorial election in Baja California, which broke the pattern.
Shared-rule dimensions also vary in their sensitivity to regime change. If
the central legislature is dissolved, suspended, or disempowered, this
affects shared rule. The capacity of regional governments to co-determine
national legislation is almost certainly reduced, and their role in constitutional
reform may also be affected. Fiscal control and executive control appear less
tightly coupled to regime change. Overall, shifts in shared rule under author-
itarianism tend to be less severe.
Democracy and regional authority
Democratization has long been associated with rising decentralization in Latin
America and beyond (Crook and Manor 1998; Diamond and Tsalik 1999).8 The
general argument is that democracy opens the door to demands that were
previously suppressed (Huber and Stephens 2012). This includes demands
for greater self-rule from geographically concentrated groups that see them-
selves as distinctive (Brancati 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2016; Massetti and
Schakel 2016). Falleti (2010, 185) observes an intimate connection between
democratization and decentralization in Brazil: ‘decentralization demands
…were imbued with the discourse of democratization’. Grindle (2007, 18)
argues that ‘audacious reforms’ decentralizing authority in Argentina,
Bolivia, and Venezuela were designed to strengthen democracy.
However, the outcome is ‘neither simple nor straightforward’ (Eaton 2004,
16; Gibson 2004; Montero and Samuels 2004). While there are strong grounds
for expecting authoritarian regimes to be less decentralized than democratic
ones, the history of Latin America provides several examples where democrats
have sought centralization and authoritarians have sought decentralization.
Case studies suggest that the effect of regime type on regional authority is
complex (Eaton 2001; Samuels 2004). Hence, it may be best to conceive
authoritarianism as a dimmer rather than an on/off light switch.
Moreover, other factors may mediate the link between democracy and
regional authority. Eaton (2004, 17) suggests that the interplay of democracy
and regionalization is historically contingent. For example, democratization in
early twentieth century Argentina and Uruguay led to the centralization of
political authority rather than the reverse, but democratization in the late
1980s and 1990s was in most countries associated with decentralization
(see below). Several scholars emphasize party competition as a mediating
factor. Studying decentralization in Bolivia and Colombia, O’Neill (2005)
argues that decentralization is a function of the anticipated electoral trade-
off for national parties in diffusing authority across national and subnational
arenas. Willis, Garman, and Haggard (1999) and Eaton (2001, 2004) propose
that decentralization occurs to the extent that subnational elites broker can-
didate selection for national elections.
Path dependence may also play a role. Comparing decentralization in
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, Falleti (2010) finds that sequencing mediates
the effect of democracy on decentralization. Reforms where political decen-
tralization is prior to fiscal or administrative decentralization lead to deeper
decentralization. Charting decentralization in Brazil, Samuels (2004) empha-
sizes that military regimes may be the ones initiating decentralization to
undercut oppositional forces (see also Eaton [2006] on Chile). Comparing
decentralization in Bolivia and Pakistan, Faguet and Shami (2015) argue that
decentralization reforms often display instrumental incoherence: they are sol-
utions to short-term political problems of leaders, such as winning the next
election, with long-term systemic consequences that may produce deep
structural change.
Theoretical expectations about democratization and regionalization are
more refined than the available evidence. Here we place our dataset on
regional authority before Latin American scholars and pair it with measures
of democratization as a step towards more valid inference. Our purpose
here is to examine plausible patterns of regionalization and democratization
in order to signpost some fruitful lines for future comparative inquiry.
We begin by empirically corroborating the overall association between
regional authority and democracy. Figure 5 plots standardized average read-
ings by year for each measure against the RAI average for all Latin American
countries. There are several widely used measures of democracy for Latin
American countries, including the Polity IV index, the two-dimensional
measure developed by Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008), Freedom
House, and Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2017). Democracy and
regional authority move broadly in tandem. In the rest of the analysis, we
use Varieties of Democracy because it has the fullest overlap with our dataset.9
We also detect a robust positive association between regime change and
change in regional authority. Table 4 summarizes fixed effects regressions
that estimate change in RAI as a function of change in democracy. Pooling
time series compounds inferential threats such as longitudinal heteroskedas-
ticity and correlation of standard errors, and this complicates the choice of an
optimal estimator (Stock and Watson 2008). Moreover, the panel is unba-
lanced because some countries became independent after 1950. Hence, our
exploration of how democracy influences regional authority looks for consist-
ency across a variety of model specifications. All independent variables have a
one-year time lag. Table 4 begins on the left with a bivariate model. Model 2
examines democracy under the controls of population, affluence, territorial
ethnicity, and a year count to address pressures of time in an unbalanced
panel. Model 3 adds a lagged dependent variable to address autocorrelation
and substantive time effects. The lagged model also allows us to control for
possible endogenous development of regional authority (Wooldridge 2002).
Across all specifications, change in democracy strongly predicts change in RAI.
The effect of regime change may ebb and flow over time, perhaps
mediated by exogenous factors, and so the final three models examine the
association for three sub-periods: 1950–1970, 1970–1990, and 1990–2010.
We find the effect of regime change to be robust across shorter time
periods as well as across the entire six decades.10 Democracy (or the lack of
Figure 5. Regional authority and democracy over time.
Notes: N = annual readings for 1950–2010 for all Latin American countries. Values are standardized across
years and countries. For Polity IV data we use the polity2 score which summarizes democracy and auth-
ority estimates; for the Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008) contestation and inclusion measures we
use the standardized factor scores recommended by the authors for comparative analysis; for Freedom
House we sum the political and civil rights dimensions and reverse so that higher scores indicate more
democracy; for Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2017) we use the Liberal (v2x_libdem) and Elec-
toral (v2x_polyarchy) dimensions.
it) appears to be the most powerful predictor of change in regional authority
in Latin America.
These aggregate trends mask more nuanced associations between the
different dimensions of the RAI and democracy, which is consistent with
the conceptualization of authoritarianism as a dimmer rather than a switch.
The RAI measure helps identify which components of authority are more vul-
nerable to authoritarianism. Indeed, Figure 3 shows that representation is the
most directly affected dimension during a democratic breakdown. Subna-
tional elections are often the first target of an authoritarian regime. Insti-
tutional depth and policy scope also decrease, albeit to a lesser degree.
Fiscal and borrowing autonomy appear relatively unaffected. In the domain
of shared rule, Figure 4 reveals that constitutional reform and law making
are the only dimensions that co-vary with change in regime type, probably
due to their closer association with national and subnational representative
institutions.
Taken together, this suggests that the political-institutional dimensions of
the RAI are more closely tied to regime change than are the fiscal dimensions.
One possible explanation is that authoritarian leaders may use the wallet (in
this case, decentralized fiscal policy) to cut the ground from under the demo-
cratic opposition. To the extent that authoritarian-controlled governments
can keep delivering public goods, perhaps support for democratic opposition
Table 4. Fixed effects model of democracy and regional authority.

















































































CONTROLS NO YES YES YES YES YES
R2 within 0.38 0.39 0.83 0.45 0.32 0.45
AIC 5967 5780 4023 1391 1844 1290
N 1419 1381 1381 364 492 500
Sources: Democracy: V-Dem’s Liberal democracy index; Population: Population logged (Penn World Tables
8.0); Affluence: GDP per capita (Penn World Tables 8.0); Ethnicity: The probability that two randomly
selected individuals in a country belong to different ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups (Alesina
et al. 2003).
Note: Fixed effects with robust clustered standard errors.
will erode. Conversely and consistently, Stoyan and Niedzwiecki (2018) find
that the political dimensions of self-rule, rather than the fiscal dimensions,
are associated with increased democratic participation. They explain this as
the result of an enhanced sense of empowerment and accountability
among citizens following political decentralization.
The two processes also tend to move together when we look at individual
countries. Figure 6 displays bivariate correlations between the RAI and V-
Dem’s Liberal democracy index for 18 Latin American countries.11 The associ-
ation is positive in 17 countries and exceeds 0.50 for 15 of these, with an
average association of 0.70. One country – Ecuador – appears to go against
the grain: the association between democracy and regional authority is nega-
tive, and Ecuador’s overall RAI score in 2010 is 5.5 points lower than in 1950.
Two factors account for this. First, at the transition to democracy in 1979, the
bicameral parliament became unicameral, with the knock-on effect that pro-
vinces lost shared rule in law making and constitutional reform through their
representation in the senate. The second factor is the haphazard implemen-
tation of far-reaching decentralization laws introduced under democracy.
The 1998 constitution established decentralized administration as a funda-
mental principle of the state, and set out a process for optional decentraliza-
tion whereby individual provinces and municipalities could apply for new
competences and resources. All but six policy areas (among them defence
and foreign policy) were eligible for decentralization. However, the transfer
process has been hindered by bureaucratic obstruction, opposition from
Figure 6. Correlation between RAI and V-Dem Liberal democracy in individual countries
for 1950–2010.
public sector unions, and sharp conflicts about fiscal transfers in times of scar-
city, as well as by an apparent reluctance among many subnational govern-
ments to take on greater policy responsibilities (Faust and Harbers 2012;
Frank 2007). Hence, Ecuador illustrates how weak implementation can
create a gap between decentralization intent and practice.
A final argument relates decentralization to democratic transition.12 This
claim emphasizes punctuated change, and anticipates that decentralization
is most likely during democratic transition. Normalization after military rule
may well be the most common path in Latin America. Figure 7 shows that
there is a lot to be said for this when we examine 23 Latin American countries
for which we have both RAI and democracy scores. The box plot on the right
summarizes annual change in regional authority during periods of democratic
transition while that on the left does the same for non-transition periods. The
contrast is stark: there is a much larger average increase in regional authority
during transition periods than at other times. A difference of means test finds
the contrast to be significant.13
Conclusion
This paper sets out an annual measure of regional authority for 27 Latin
America and Caribbean countries since 1950. Our focus is on legal authority,
so we steer clear of informal conditions – party political structures, clientelism,
the effect of individual leaders – on the ground that it is useful to keep these
Figure 7. Democratic transition and decentralization.
Note: The horizontal line indicates the median, the boxes the interquartile range, the whiskers the 5–95
percentiles, and the dots values that are two standard deviations out from the mean. Three countries show
large negative annual change in regional authority outside democratic consolidation: Argentina (−0.62),
Ecuador (−0.20), and Brazil (−0.19).
separate if we wish to evaluate their independent causal effects. Regional
authority is broken down into 10 dimensions which capture the extent to
which a regional government exercises authority over those who live in the
region (self-rule) and the extent to which it co-exercises authority in the
country (shared rule). The measure is designed to pick up variation at the
level of the individual region rather than the regional tier, which is particularly
helpful in mapping differentiated governance for Latin America’s indigenous
peoples.
Any measure of regional authority for Latin America and the Caribbean
must come to grips with how authoritarianism impinges on regional authority.
This requires an instrument that is sensitive to the shades of gray between
liberal democracy and authoritarianism. Indeed, authoritarian rule constrains
but does not necessarily neutralize regional authority, and we discuss how our
measure can pick up variation.
Overall, regional authority co-varies with democracy in Latin America
across countries and time. This fine-grained measure allows us to engage a
number of questions relating to regional authority and democratization. If
an authoritarian regime violates individual rights, can these rights be pro-
tected at the regional level? If authoritarian governments concentrate
central power, to what extent can regional governments resist central impera-
tives? When can one observe more than deconcentration of authority under
an authoritarian regime?
Our effort to conceptualize and code regional authority contributes to the
broader literature on multilevel governance.14 There is much here that would
repay detailed investigation. To begin with, the relationship between regime
type and regional authority merits further analysis. Additionally, some small
and relatively ethnically homogenous countries have created differentiated
regions with substantial political authority for indigenous communities (Nicar-
agua and Panama), while some larger and more diverse states have been
reluctant (Brazil, Mexico, Peru). Some of the most stable democratic regimes
in Latin America have centrally appointed regional executives (Chile and
Costa Rica), while more fragile democracies have introduced regional elec-
tions (Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru). The purpose of the RAI is to help to
uncover these and other puzzles.
Notes
1. The entire project encompasses 81 countries including 11 in South-East Asia and
the Pacific, all EU and OECD member states, and 10 in Europe beyond the EU, as
well as all of Latin America (Hooghe et al. 2016).
2. This work is underway. Andreas Ladner and colleagues developed a local gov-
ernment index modeled on the RAI for 39 European countries (Ladner,
Keuffer, and Baldersheim 2016). And our RAI team is working on an update of
the RAI index for 90+ countries that will include estimates of self-rule and shared
rule for metropolitan governance.
3. The data are available on http://garymarks.web.unc.edu and http://
saraniedzwiecki.com/data.
4. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela. In five of
those, this region is the capital (Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Paraguay,
and Mexico).
5. Ecuador falls off the 10+ list because its RAI decreased to 8.0 in 2010.
6. In Bolivia, Colombia, and Nicaragua, special autonomous regions have directly
elected assemblies and executives. In Panama, some indigenous communities
have indirectly elected assemblies, and others directly elected assemblies;
executives are headed by a local representative and a government appointee.
7. Haiti is the only country that has gone in the opposite direction.
8. Regional authority in Latin America has been shaped by its interaction with
democracy and authoritarianism. Most research considers national polities as
the sole unit of observation for regime type, an assumption shared by the
major indices of political regime (Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008; Mar-
shall and Jaggers 2002; V-DEM). However, there is a burgeoning literature that
investigates how democracy and authoritarianism may coexist across tiers (Ger-
vasoni 2010; Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2014; Harbers and Ingram 2014). Multilevel
governance opens up the possibility of examining the interplay between
regimes at different levels. Authoritarian central regimes may leave regional
authority untouched; national democratic regimes may harbor repressive
regional governments. The recently released VDEM data set contains a series
of questions about regional democracy, which make it possible to estimate
the average quality of democracy, but not democracy at the level of the individ-
ual region (see McMann 2016).
9. The findings reported here are broadly consistent across all four measures of
democracy.
10. Lags of two or three years produce similar results.
11. The positive association between democracy and regional authority is robust
when we correlate levels or changes in V-Dem and the RAI.
12. A related but different argument connects regime volatility with regional auth-
ority volatility (Hooghe and Marks 2016, 55–57). This effect is sharpest in federa-
tions, where the powers of constituent units are constitutionally entrenched. A
comparison of regional authority in 11 federations finds that federations experi-
encing regime volatility (including four Latin American countries) witness three
to four times as many reforms than stable democratic federations. Moreover,
these reforms tend to have large substantive effects. In the absence of regime
instability, federal countries experience very few reforms, and when they do
engage in reform, it tends to fluctuate around the status quo. Hence, more fre-
quent regime change in Latin America compared with the OECD helps explain
why regional authority is more volatile.
13. On average, regional authority increases annually by 0.30 points in a year of
democratic transition, while it decreases by −0.04 points on average in a non-
transition year (p < .005). A country receives a score of 1 if it is in a democratic
transition period, which is any 10 years following a Polity shift from a score of
5 (or lower) on the −10 to +10 scale to a score of 6 or higher and when the
Polity score does not drop below 6 during the following nine years. All other
years, including periods of stable democracy, are coded zero. We experimented
with variations on these criteria with no appreciably different results.
14. For an excellent summary of the literature on subnational politics, see Giraudy,
Moncada, and Snyder (forthcoming).
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